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NOTES 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-The Doctrine of Equitable 
Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds 
In 1677 the English Parliament enacted the first Statute of 
Frauds to prevent "many fraudulent practices, which are commonly 
endeavored to be upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury."1 
The trial system then existing in England was forced to depend 
upon unreliable juries, and relied upon few rules of evidence be-
sides the rule treating parties to an action as incompetent witnesses.2 
Thus, in passing the Statute, Parliament sought to minimize the 
abuses possible under the trial system by providing that virtually 
no important contract would be enforceable unless reduced to 
writing:1 
Despite the vast development of legal processes since the late 
seventeenth century, a law similar to the English Statute of Frauds 
may be found in every American jurisdiction.4 The retention of the 
requirement of a writing has been justified on three grounds: (1) 
the Statute serves an "evidentiary" function, lessening the danger 
that courts or juries will be misled by perjured testimony as to the 
existence or purport of a contract; (2) it has a "cautionary" effect, 
tending to impress upon the contracting parties the significance of 
their agreement; and (3) it acts as a "channeling" device, providing 
I. 29 CAR. 2, c. 3 (1677). 
2. Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 
440, 441 (1931). 
3. The basic provisions of the Statute are well summarized in id. at 440-41: 
I. No interest in lands, except leases not exceeding three years, could be created 
or surrendered except by a writing. 
II. Signed memoranda were required: 
(a) to validate promises, of an executor or administrator to answer for damages 
out of his personal estate, or 
(b) of a person to pay the debt of another; 
(c) to enforce fulfillment of contracts made on consideration of marriage, or 
(d) of executory contracts for the sale of lands; and 
(e) to enforce performance of contracts that could not be executed within 
the year. 
III. Creation or assignments of trusts in land were void unless evidenced by a 
writing, or were created by operation of law. 
IV. Contracts for the sale of goods of a greater value than ten pounds were not 
enforceable unless the contracting parties signed a memorandum of the contract 
or partly performed it. 
4. The Uniform Commercial Code also includes a requirement of a writing: 
Section 2-201. Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds. 
(I) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods 
for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless 
there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made 
between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought 
or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits 
or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under 
this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such a writing. 
[ 170] 
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a basis for distinguishing contracts which are enforceable from those 
which are not.5 
It has been hypothesized that had the original Statute of Frauds-
been strictly enforced from the time of its enactment, a strong 
custom would have developed of reducing all contracts within its 
scope to ·writing, and that thereby numerous frauds and perjuries 
could have been avoided. 6 The validity of this position has never 
been tested conclusively. Not only has the scope of the Statute grad-
ually been narrowed by judicial construction,7 but some jurisdic-
tions have recognized exceptions to the requirements of the Statute 
which threaten drastically to reduce its impact. 
Historically, the equitable doctrine of part performance was the 
first means adopted by the courts to circumvent the Statute. In fact, 
the idea that an oral contract for the sale of land can be "taken out 
of the Statute of Frauds"8 by certain conduct on the part of the 
5. The respective importance of these functions are discussed at length in Fuller, 
Consideration and Form, 41 Cou.nr. L. REv. 799 (1941). Another defense of the require-
ment of a writing may be found in Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in 
Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 746-48 (1931). Taking the contrary position are: Burdick, 
A Statute for Promoting Fraud, 16 CoLUM. L. REv. 273 (1916); Corbin, The Uniform 
Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 829 (1950); Summers, 
supra note 2, at 441-43; Willis, The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. 
L.J. 427, 528 (1928). 
6. Dissenting in Brewood v. Cook, 207 F.2d 439, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1953), Judge Pretty-
man adopts this view and quotes the following statement of Lord Redesdale with 
approval: 
[The Statute of Frauds] was made for the purpose of preventing perjuries and 
frauds, and nothing can be more manifest to any person who has been in the habit 
of practicing in the courts of equity, than that the relaxation of the statute has 
been the ground for much perjury and fraud. If the statute had been vigorously 
observed, the result would probably have been that few instances of parole agree-
ments would have occurred; agreements would, from the necessity of the case, 
have been reduced to writing: whereas it is manifest that the decisions on the 
subject have opened a new door to fraud •..• [A]nd I remember it was men-
tioned •.• as a common expression at the bar, that it had become a practice to 
"improve gentlemen out of their estates." It is therefore absolutely necessary for 
courts of equity to make a stand and not carry the decisions any further .••• 
Lindsay v. Lynch, 2 Sch. &: Lef. 1, 5 (Ir. Ch. 1804). 
7. Thus a promise to pay the debt of another has been construed to encompass only 
promises made to a creditor which do not benefit the promisor (RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 184 (1932); 3 s. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 452 Qaeger ed. 1960)); a promise in 
consideration of marriage has been interpreted to exclude mutual promises to marry 
(RESTATEMENT, supra § 192; 3 S. "WILLISTON, supra § 485); a promise not to be per-
formed within one year means a promise not performable within one year (RESTATE-
ME1''T, supra § 198; 3 S. WILLISTON, supra § 495); a promise not to be performed within 
one year may be removed from the Statute of Frauds if one party has fully performed 
(RESTATEMENT, supra § 198; 3 S. 'WILLISTON, supra § 504); and the Statute will not 
be applied where all promises involved are fully performed (RESTATEMENT, supra 
§ 219; 3 s. WILLISTON, supra § 528). 
8. Though this phrase has been used in inumerable cases, Professor Corbin argues 
that it is not really accurate: "Part performance of a contract for the transfer of land 
does not take the case out of the statute; but it may be of such a character that it 
will take the statute out of the case." 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 420, at 452 (1950). 
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vendee or vendor is as old as the Statute itself,9 and has long been 
embodied in the law of the overwhelming majority of American 
jurisdictions.10 Thus, today the doctrine of part performance pre-
sents no great controversy. However, perhaps because the part per-
formance principle developed so early, the prerequisites for its appli-
cation have become relatively fixed. First, the doctrine operates 
primarily11 in the area of land-sale contracts.12 Second, the conduct 
which is to constitute part performance must be "unequivocally 
referable" to the alleged oral agreement13-the act must be one 
which cannot readily be explained absent the existence of a con-
tract.14 Finally, since part performance is regarded as a purely equi-
table doctrine,15 relief granted under it traditionally has been 
limited to specific performance, and if substantial justice can be 
achieved through a restitution remedy, part performance may not 
be available to enforce a contract in disregard of the Statute.16 
Although the requirements for the application of part perfor-
mance are fairly well defined, both courts and commentators are 
divided as to the theoretical basis of the doctrine. Some have ex-
plained the part performance exception on the theory that conduct 
which is "unequivocally referable" to an oral contract satisfactorily 
fulfills the evidentiary function that the Statute of Frauds was in 
9. See Costigan, The Date and Authorship of the Statute of Frauds, 26 HARV. L. 
REV. 329, 344 (1913): 
[T)he statute's framers were thoroughly familiar with the part-performance 
problem, and the decisions which shortly after the Statute of Frauds settled the 
law that part-performance would make the oral contract for the sale of land en-
forceable in chancery, notwithstanding the statute are conclusive evidence that 
its framers never intended the statute to prevent the giving of equitable relief in 
part-performance cases. 
10. Only Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee have repudiated 
the part performance principle. See 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 8, § 443. 
11. Though in recent years some courts have occasionally applied the part per-
formance doctrine to oral agreements falling within the other clauses of the Statute, 
see 2 id. §§ 459, 465, in most states deviation from the land contract situation has not 
been common. See 3 S. 'WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 533. 
12. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 7, § 197. 
13. See Winslow v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 188 U.S. 646, 658 (1903); 2 A. CORBIN, 
supra note 8, § 430; 3 S. l\TILLISTON, supra note 7, § 533. 
14. Regarding this point, Judge Cardozo said: 
Not every act of part performance will move a court of equity, though legal 
remedies are inadequate, to enforce an oral agreement affecting rights in land. 
There must be performance "unequivocally referable" to the agreement, per-
formance which alone and without aid of words of promise is unintelligible or 
at least extraordinary, unless as an incident of ownership, assured, if not existing • 
. . . What is done must itself supply the key of what is promised. It is not suffi-
cient that what is promised may give significance to what is done. 
Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 232, 135 N.E. 273 (1922). Common examples of 
conduct which meet this test are a vendee's taking possession of land and making 
valuable improvements or a vendor's conveying land. See 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 8, 
§ 434. 
15. See 2 id. § 422. 
16. See 2 id. § 425, 427. 
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large part designed to perform.17 Others, however, have maintained 
that part performance is based on the ancient equity doctrine of 
estoppel in pais, or equitable estoppel.18 This doctrine provides that 
one who makes a representation of fact on which another justifiably 
relies to his detriment should not thereafter be permitted to deny 
the truth of his representation in order to assert rights against the 
relying party.19 
Thus, under the label of part performance all jurisdictions may 
have long recognized what is in effect a closely circumscribed form 
of equitable estoppel as a limited exception to the Statute of Frauds. 
However, in recent years the doctrine of equitable estoppel in its 
mm right has become increasingly significant as an exception to the 
Statute of Frauds. In fact, today some American jurisdictions apply 
the doctrine in a much more sweeping fashion in Statute of Frauds 
cases than was permissible even under normal equitable estoppel 
principles. In the past fifty years, the courts of a substantial minor-
ity of the states have relaxed the historical prerequisites20 for the 
17. For example, in Green v. Groves, 109 Ind. 519, 525, IO N.E. 401, 404 (1887) the 
court stated: "The philosophical reason why a part performance will take a parole 
contract without [sic] the statute is that the acts constituting such a part performance, 
of themselves, are to a greater or lesser extent, evidence of the contract." 
18. See cases cited in Annot., 101 A.L.R. 923, 935 n.53 (1936); F. POLLOCK, CON· 
TRACTS 521-22 (Winfield ed. 1950). Professor Corbin sees little value in speculating 
about which philosophy underlies part performance since, under either theory, "the 
practical result is that the agreement is enforced." 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 8, § 421, 
at 454. 
19. In the part performance context, the necessary representation would presum-
ably be supplied by the defendant's oral promise to perform, although this is not, 
strictly speaking, a representation of fact. The reliance might be supplied by the 
plaintiff's performance of either part of the agreed exchange, or other acts of reliance 
-for example, entry into possession of land and making improvements thereon. Since 
part performance requires only this kind of reasonable reliance, the term "part per-
formance" is misleading, and the fact that such reliance will suffice to bring the 
doctrine into play certainly indicates close kinship to the doctrine of equitable es-
toppel. A multitude of cases have held that the performance need not be a part of 
the duty undertaken by the plaintiff as a part of his exchange performance and that 
taking possession and making improvements will bring the doctrine into play. See 
2 id.§ 426. 
20. Professor Pomeroy enumerated six elements that he felt must be established 
before an estoppel could be raised: 
I. There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a rep• 
resentation or concealment of material facts. 
2. These facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his said 
conduct or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is 
necessarily imputed to him. 
3. The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claim-
ing the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when such conduct was done, and at 
the time when it was acted upon by him. 
4. The conduct must be done with the intention, or at least with the expectation, 
that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under circumstances that it is 
both natural and probable that it will be so acted upon. • • . 
5. The conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he 
must be led to act upon it. 
6. He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his position for 
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application of equitable estoppel in the Statute of Frauds context. 
One fundamental change that these courts have effected is to elim-
inate the traditional21 requirement that the reliance be upon a mis-
representation of fact.-Aimost equally important, they have lessened 
the amount of injury that must be shown before the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel can operate. Thus, in these jurisdictions equi-
table estoppel in Statute of Frauds cases now rests on the broad prin-
ciple that the law should not refuse to enforce an oral contract 
falling within the Statute when such refusal would cause "uncon-
scionable injury" to a party who has justifiably relied on the other 
party's contractual promise. Since it has long been established that, 
despite its name, equitable estoppel is equally available in actions 
for damages at law as in suits for specific performance in equity,22 
this expanded doctrine allows plaintiffs to avoid the Statute in 
virtually all cases except those in which enforcement of the Statute 
would not produce an "unconscionable" result.23 
The following situation is illustrative of one factual context in 
which a broad principle of equitable estoppel might be held to 
operate: A, a Michigan farmer, enters into an oral agreement 
whereby he contracts to participate in B's five-year hog-leasing 
program in return for, among other things, B's promise to take and 
dispose of A's surplus stock. A makes a substantial investment to 
institute the leasing plan, but when he seeks to enforce B's promise, 
B refuses to perform on the ground that the contract, being inca-
the worse; in other words, he must so act upon it that he would suffer a loss if 
he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter what he has done by reason 
of the first party being permitted to repudiate his conduct and assert rights 
inconsistent with it. 
3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 805, at 191-92 (Symons ed. 1941). However, his 
effort, at least in the Statute of Frauds context, has had only a limited degree of 
success. Compare Ozier v. Haines, 411 Ill. 160, 103 N.E.2d 485 (1952) (adopting 
Pomeroy's tests) with Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950) 
(not requiring a representation of fact) and Hurst v. Thomas, 265 Ala. 398, 91 So. 2d 
692 (1956) (requiring proof of actual fraud). 
21. Originally, courts would only employ equitable estoppel in cases where actual 
fraud with its requirement of scienter had been proven. 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 20, 
§§ 802, 803; Summers, supra note 2, at 443-45. However, by the late nineteenth century 
it became generally accepted that a showing of misrepresentation would be sufficient. 
3 J. POMEROY, supra §§ 803, 806, especially at 200-01. 
22. See Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 582-84 (1879); 3 J. POMEROY, supra 
note 20, § 802, at 181-84; 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 533A, at 792. But see Magnat 
Corp. v. B & B Electroplating Co., 358 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1966); Goodwin v. Gillingham, 
10 Wash. 2d 656, 117 P.2d 959 (1941). 
23. Examples of cases in which the expanded doctrine would not be applicable 
would include those where the action is to obtain recovery for an expectation interest 
[see, e.g., Bach v. Perkins, 223 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1955); Bonnear v. Bank of America, 
84 Cal. App. 2d 107, 190 P.2d 307 (1948)], where the plaintiff's reliance is unjustifiable 
[see, e.g., Aubrey v. Workman, 384 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)], or where satis-
factory relief is available in restitution (see, e.g., Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580, 147 
P. 259 (1915); Kobus v. San Diego Trust and Sav. Bank, 172 Cal. App. 2d 574, 342 
P.2d 468 (1959); S. WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 533A, at 809). 
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pable of performance within one year, is unenforceable under the 
Statute of Frauds.24 
In this illustration it is clear that if the principle of equitable 
estoppel is applied to enforce the parties' oral agreement, it is being 
used in substantial derogation of the Statute of Frauds and the 
legislative policies presumably incorporated in it. It is not surpris-
ing, then, that courts have varied widely in their willingness to 
apply the doctrine broadly. Among the courts which have considered 
the issue, most appear to have decided to accept or reject this broad 
principle of equitable estoppel by making a conscious policy deter-
mination that "doing justice" in any particular case does, or does 
not, outweigh the general considerations which led the legislature 
to enact the Statute. A substantial minority, however, when con-
fronted with the argument that equitable estoppel should preclude 
application of the Statute, have reached their results through reason-
ing which does not properly distinguish equitable estoppel from 
either the doctrine of part performance and or that of promissory 
estoppel. These courts have thus failed to make the fundamental 
policy determination which, it is submitted, is required by the issue 
with which they were presented. 
The courts of California have been more willing than those 
of any other jurisdiction broadly to apply equitable estoppel in 
Statute of Frauds cases.25 They clearly have done so with the inten-
tion of restricting the Statute's operation to those cases in which its 
application would not produce an "unfair" result. This policy de-
termination, originally set forth in the 1909 landmark case of Sey-
mour v. Oelrichs,26 was strongly reaffirmed in 1950 in Monarco v. 
Lo Greco.21 In the latter decision, the court announced two general 
standards for determining when an estoppel may properly be raised. 
It stated that a party will be estopped to plead the Statute of Frauds 
if either "unconscionable injury ... [will] result from denying en-
forcement of the contract after one party has been induced by the 
other seriously to change his position in reliance on the contract"28 
or "unjust enrichment ... [will] result if a party who has received 
24. This situation is based directly on the case of Oxley v. Ralston Purina Co., 349 
F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1965). For other recent cases in which variations of the problem are 
presented, see, e.g., Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 190 S.2d 777 
(Fla. Sup. Ct. 1966); Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d IO, 195 N.E.2d 
250 (1964). 
25. For two excellent discussions of the use of equitable estoppel in California, 
see Comment, Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 53 CALIF. 
L. R.Ev. 590 (1965); Comment, Part Performance, Estoppel, and the California Statute 
of Frauds, 3 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1951). 
26. 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909). 
27. 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950). 
28. Id. at 623, 220 P.2d at 739. 
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the benefits of the other's performance is allowed to rely upon the 
statute."29 
In the years following Monarco, the limits on the "unjust en-
richment" standard have become fairly well established in Califor-
nia. It appears clear that where a restitution remedy would ade-
quately reimburse a plaintiff, equitable estoppel will not bar an 
assertion of the Statute of Frauds as a defense to a suit on an oral 
agreement. 30 
The limits of the "unconscionable injury" standard are not, 
however, so well defined. The liberal interpretation that a court 
may give these words is seen clearly in Goldstein v. McNeil,31 a 
case decided by a California district court of appeals. In this action, 
plaintiff, pursuant to an oral contract of sale, shipped a quantity of 
used cars to defendant. While the cars were still in transit, defen-
dant gave notice that he would not accept them, and plaintiff was 
forced to negotiate a second sale on the open market, thereby in-
curring a substantial loss. When plaintiff sued on the oral contract, 
the court held that defendant was estopped to plead the Statute of 
Frauds and awarded full difference-money damages. It found that 
"unconscionable injury" would result if it refused to enforce the 
contract because plaintiff, in performing his part of the agreement, 
"missed a very high market existing around the time of the contract 
and was caught in a sharp slump."32 Thus, the Goldstein court would 
presumably be quick to find "unconscionable injury" in a great 
many cases involving breaches of sales contracts, since such breaches 
are often occasioned by a significant change in price. 
The Goldstein decision appears to represent the most extreme 
application ever given equitable estoppel in the Statute of Frauds 
context. However, the courts of at least seven other jurisdictions, 
although they might stop short of Goldstein, have apparently based 
their decision to apply the doctrine broadly on a genuine belief that 
the Statute of Frauds has largely outlived its usefulness.33 Yet, other 
courts, in deciding that the estoppel principle bars a party from 
29. Id. at 623-24, 220 P.2d at 740. 
30. Kobus v. San Diego Trust & Sav. Bank, 172 Cal. App. 2d 574, 342 P.2d 468 
(1959); Palmer v. Phillips, 123 Cal. App. 2d 291, 266 P.2d 850 (1954); Chahon v. 
Schneider, II7 Cal. App. 2d 334, 256 P.2d 54 (1953); Jirshick v. Farmers & Merchants 
Nat'l Bank, 107 Cal. App. 2d 405, 237 P.2d 49 (1951). 
31. 122 Cal. App. 2d 608, 265 P.2d II3 (1954). 
32. Id. at 612, 265 P.2d at 115. 
33. Brewood v. Cook, 207 F.2d 439 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 
214, 211 P.2d 806 (1949); Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551, 381 P.2d 802 (1963); Ham-
burger v. Hirsch, 212 S.W. 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919); B.F.C. Morris Co. v. Mason, 171 
Okla. 589, 39 P.2d 1 (1935) (plaintiff losing on a different issue); Ross v. Midelburg, 
129 W. Va. 851, 42 S.E.2d 185 (1947); Vogel v. Shaw, 42 Wyo. 333, 294 P. 687 (1930). 
In Oxley v. Ralston Purina Co., 349 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1965), the Sixth Circuit decided 
that if confronted by this problem this is the way the Supreme Court of Michigan 
would resolve the conflict between the Statute of Frauds and equitable estoppel. 
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pleading the Statute, have done so on the basis of such confused 
reasoning that any policy determination they may have made as to 
the Statute's utility is left almost totally obscured. The primary 
source of their confusion lies in their failure to distinguish properly 
between the doctrines of equitable and promissory estoppel. 
The position that promissory estoppel can somehow operate to 
preclude a party from asserting a Statute of Frauds defense has been 
adopted in five jurisdictions34 and has been argued but rejected in a 
number of others.35 Several of the courts that have accepted this 
theory seem to have felt obliged to do so because the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel was well established in their respective states.36 
It is here submitted that they were in no way so bound. 
The principle of promissory estoppel received its classical formu-
lation in the Restatement of Contracts, section 90: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forebearance of a definite and substantial character on the 
part of the promisee and which does induce such action or fore-
bearance is binding if in justice can be avoided only by enforcement 
of the promise. 
While nothing in the language of section 90 seems to preclude ap-
plying promissory estoppel in the usual Statute of Frauds situation, 
the history of the section's use and the context in which it appears 
in the Restatement clearly indicate that section 90 cannot properly 
be cited as authority for applying promissory estoppel in Statute of 
Frauds cases.37 As originally conceived, section 90 was probably in-
tended to make gratuitous promises enforceable after the promisee 
had acted in reliance in a way which the promisor should have fore-
34. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. Alaska 1954); Miller 
v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954); In re Field's Estate, 11 Misc. 2d 427, 
172 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Surr. Ct. 1958); Aubrey v. Workman, 384 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1964); Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956). In the last two cases cited, 
the courts held in favor of the defendants but only because plaintiffs had failed to 
prove that they had relied to their substantial detriment. 
35. Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 190 S.2d 777 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 
1966); Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 45 III. App. 2d 10, 195 N.E.2d 250 (1964). 
36. For example, in In re Field's Estate, 11 Misc. 2d 427, 172 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Surr. 
Ct. 1958) the court enforced an oral contract that was not performable within one 
year, holding in the alternative that "the proven reliance upon the oral promise by 
the university under these facts would require the invocation of promissory estoppel, 
preventing decedent or his privies from raising a defense based on the Statute of 
Frauds." Id. at 433, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 747 (emphasis added). 
37. For a thorough examination of the development and uses of promissory es-
toppel, see Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle From Precedents, 50 MICH. L. REV. 
639, 873 (1952); Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the 
Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 459 (1950). It is also significant that although Restatement 
§ 90 has been substantially expanded in REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 
(Tent. Draft No. 2 1965), reference to the Statute of Frauds problem is conspicuously 
absent. 
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seen.38 In practice, however, courts have applied the section more 
broadly, using it also in connection with contract formation to justify 
treating some contractual offers as irrevocable.39 Thus, when an 
offeror should have foreseen that an offeree might rely on his offer 
prior to acceptance, courts have invoked the section to prevent the 
offeror from successfully pleading the absence of formal acceptance 
or consideration to defeat the contractual claim of the offeree. 
That section 90 has been applied to convert an offer and reliance 
thereon into what is in effect an option contract provides no prece-
dent for using promissory estoppel to preclude a Statute of Frauds 
defense. The difference between the two situations is dramatized by 
the following hypothetical: A orally offers to sell B his law books for 
$600, 40 and B orally accepts. The contract is never reduced to writ-
ing, but B, not realizing that a writing is required and in reliance 
on A's promise to perform, signs a contract whereby he agrees to 
resell the books to C. The price of law books then rises sharply, and 
A refuses to perform on the ground that his contract with B is un-
enforceable because of its failure to meet the requirements of the 
Statute of Frauds. In this situation the court is not asked to pass on 
the existence of a contract, for all the elements of contract forma-
tion are present. The question instead is whether the policies 
embodied in the Statute preclude enforcement of the contract, 
which admittedly exists. 
Not only does the history of section 90 suggest that promissory 
estoppel is not proper authority for enforcing the contract in such 
a case, but it is significant that the Restatement has sought to deal 
with the Statute of Frauds situation under an entirely different 
heading. Section 178, comment f states: 
Though there has been no satisfaction of the Statute, an estoppel 
may preclude objection on that ground .... A misrepresentation 
that there has been such satisfaction if substantial action is taken in 
reliance on the representation, precludes proof by the party who 
made the representation that it was false; and a promise to make a 
memorandum, if similarly relied on, may give rise to an effective 
38. REsrATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90, Illustrations 1-3 (1932). 
39. See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); cf. 
Northwestern Eng'r v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1943). But see James 
Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). In this regard, see REsTATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 89(b)(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2 1965): 
An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action of forc-
bearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance, 
and which does induce such action or forebearance is binding as an option con-
tract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice. 
In addition, see comment e to § 89(b)(2), and the Reporter's Note to comment e. 
40. The Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted in forty-nine states, 
only requires a writing for contracts for the sale of goods for $500 or more. UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(1), quoted in note 4 supra. 
November 1967] Notes 179 
promissory estoppel if the Statute would otherwise operate to 
defraud. 
The principle of estoppel set forth above is considerably more 
limited in scope than that contained in section 90. By section 178, 
the Statute of Frauds defense is only precluded if there has been 
(1) a misrepresentation that the Statute's requirements have already 
been complied with, or (2) a promise that they will be met.41 The 
first of these conditions posits a situation in which equitable estoppel 
is clearly appropriate by the traditional standards, for it includes a 
misrepresentation of fact and justifiable reliance thereon. The 
second condition, while expressly referring to promissory estoppel, 
makes much different use of the doctrine than do the courts. It 
requires not only that the promise giving rise to the estoppel go to 
the Statute of Frauds, but also that this promise, rather than merely 
the promise to perform, be relied upon by the plaintiff. 
The implicit rationale for the second part of comment f seems to 
be that promissory estoppel may act as a basis for enforcing the 
promise to reduce an agreement to writing, a promise which, not 
being part of a part of a bilateral contract, would otherwise be un-
enforceable. Significantly, none of the five courts that have applied 
promissory estoppel in derogation of the Statute of Frauds has 
rested its decisions on this analysis. Indeed only two42 have required 
a promise to execute a ·writing at all. The other three43 appear to 
have adopted the view that promissory estoppel applies when the 
reliance is merely on the promise to perform the oral agreement 
itself. This approach might be justifiable if motivated by a policy 
determination to limit the Statute of Frauds. It may well be, how-
ever, that these five courts have joined the group that broadly ap-
plies an estoppel principle in the Statute of Frauds area solely be-
cause they mistakenly believed that the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel required this result.44 
Thus, a substantial minority of jurisdictions have provided, 
either by a conscious policy determination or by a conceptual con-
fusion, a broad avenue of escape from the provisions of the Statute 
of Frauds. The remaining American courts that have dealt with the 
relation between equitable estoppel and the Statute of Frauds have 
41. See 3 S. 'WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 533A where these requirements are also 
imposed. 
42. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. Alaska 1954); Easton 
v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956). 
43. Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954); In re Field's Estate, 
11 Misc. 2d 427, 172 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Surr. Ct. 1958); Aubrey v. Workman, 384 S.W.2d 
389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). 
44. In this regard it is noteworthy that the California courts have only once made 
use of promissory estoppel to avoid the effect of the Statute of Frauds [Sessions v. 
Southern California Edison Co., 47 Cal. App. 2d 611, 118 P.2d 935 (1947)], and they 
have been severely criticized for doing so [Comment, 3 STAN. L. REv. 281, 294 (1951)]. 
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consistently refused to extend the estoppel doctrine to the point 
where it would restrict seriously the operation of the Statute. Indeed 
some have limited application of the doctrine in this context further 
than history would seem to justify.45 Moreover, as was found to be 
the case in the states that broadly apply equitable estoppel, the re-
sults encountered here seem only sometimes to be grounded on a 
fundamental policy decision to maintain the integrity of the Statute 
of Frauds; frequently, a court's refusal to apply equitable estoppel 
appears to be based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of the 
doctrine and the requisites for its use. 
Among the states whose decisions effectuate the policies of the 
Statute, only Pennsylvania has categorically rejected the principle of 
equitable estoppel as a means of enforcing oral contracts falling 
within the Statute's scope.46 In most other of these jurisdictions, 
equitable estoppel has expressly been accepted, but not in its ex-
tended form. The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Ozier v. 
Haines41 is typical. In this case, the court held that in the absence of 
a misrepresentation of fact defendant could not be estopped from 
pleading the Statute of Frauds, although it realized this result might 
work hardship in a particular case. Thus, the court stated: "It is 
true that harsh results, or moral fraud ... may occur where one has 
changed his position in reliance on the oral promise of another, but 
it is a result which is invited and risked when the agreement is not 
reduced to writing in the manner prescribed by law."48 
In at least two states,49 the courts have decided that even the 
normal principles of equitable estoppel should not operate to bar 
a party from asserting a Statute of Frauds defense to an oral contract; 
they require proof that the defendant was guilty of actual fraud 
before they estop him from raising the Statute as a defense. At one 
time, it was essential that a party be able to show actual fraud in 
order to rely on equitable estoppel; but by the end of the nineteenth 
45. See notes 51, 52, & 54 infra, and accompanying text. 
46. Polka v. May, 383 Pa. 80, ll8 A.2d 154 (1955). Although there does not appear 
to have been any detrimental reliance in this particular case, the court did not ground 
its decision on this fact. Rather it made the sweeping proclamation that "the principle 
of estoppel may not be invoked against the operation of the statute of frauds." Id. 
at 84, II8 A.2d at 156 (footnotes omitted). This blanket statement was later reaffirmed 
in Beers v. Pusey, 389 Pa. II7, 132 A.2d 346 (1957), but once again it does not seem 
that plaintiff had relied to his detriment. 
47. 4ll Ill. 160, 103 N.E.2d 485 (1952). This case has recently been followed in 
Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d IO, 195 N.E.2d 250 (1964). 
48. 4ll Ill. 160, 164-65, 103 N.E.2d 485, 488 (1952). For similar statements, see, e.g., 
Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 190 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1966); 
Purcell v. Campbell, 261 Ky. 644, 88 S.W.2d 670 (1935); Nehls v. Williams Stock 
Farming Co., 43 Nev. 253, 184 P. 212, reafj'd 185 P. 563 (1919); Kooba v. Jacobitti, 59 
N.J. Super. 496, 158 A.2d 194 (App. Div. 1960); Treadwell v. Henderson, 58 N.M. 230, 
269 P.2d II08 (1954). 
49. Hurst v. Thomas, 265 Ala. 398, 91 S.2d 692 (1956); Newman v. Newman, 103 
Ohio St. 230, 133 N.E. 70 (1921). 
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century a mere showing of a misrepresentation of fact was deemed 
sufficient.50 That these courts have reverted to the stricter test in the 
Statute of Frauds context reflects their respect for the legislature's 
policy determination in enacting the Statute. 
As has been suggested, the decisions of a number of courts which 
have severely limited the estoppel principle fail to reflect any con-
scious policy determination to defer to the Statute. In some jurisdic-
tions this may be explained by the courts' apparent confusion as to 
the scope of the equitable estoppel doctrine and the prerequisites 
for its application. Thus, in Massachusetts51 and Washington52 the 
courts have refused to apply the doctrine in actions at law even 
though elsewhere it has long been accepted53 that the doctrine, in 
spite of its name, is in no way exclusively equitable in character. 
Similarly, it appears to be the law in Georgia54 that equitable estop-
pel can only operate against a defendant who has benefited from 
plaintiff's reliance, although elsewhere such a requirement has never 
been among the prerequisites of the doctrine's use.55 These peculiar 
restrictions on the equitable estoppel principle may give these courts 
an easy way of avoiding the policy conflict posed by a broad applica-
tion of the equitable estoppel principle in the Statute of Frauds 
context. 
The most important source of confusion among the courts which 
limit the operation of the doctrine in Statute of Frauds cases is the 
failure to distinguish between equitable estoppel and part perfor-
mance. Although both these doctrines may well be grounded upon 
the same theoretical basis,56 part performance has been carefully 
limited and may be invoked only when certain well defined pre-
requisites are met, whereas equitable estoppel-at least in the form 
adopted in California and the other states following its lead-is 
limited by little more than a general notion of fairness. As noted 
earlier, while part performance operates mainly in land contract 
situations, requires proof that plaintiff's reliance "unequivocally 
refer" to the oral contract, and is rarely applied in actions at law,57 
equitable estoppel is ordinarily not restricted in any of these ways.58 
Thus, when a court is asked to apply equitable estoppel to enforce a 
contract which is othenvise unenforceable because of the Statute, 
it should recognize that the doctrine invoked poses a much more 
50. See note 21 supra. 
51. Magnat Corp. v. B & B Electroplating Co., 358 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1966). 
52. Goodwin v. Gillingham, 10 Wash. 2d 656, 117 P.2d 959 (1941). 
53. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
54. Cofer v. Wofford Oil Co., 85 Ga. App. 444, 450, 69 S.E.2d 674, 678 (1952). 
55. See note 20 supra. 
56. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. 
57. See note 11-16 supra and accompanying text. 
58. See 3 S. WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 533A, at 787-803 Gaeger ed. 1960); notes 22-23 
supra. 
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serious threat to the Statute of Frauds than does part performance. 
Nevertheless, in at least four states59 the terms equitable estoppel 
and part performance have been used virtually interchangeably, and 
the stricter requirements of part performance have been imposed 
in all cases. In two other jurisdictions dissenting judges have es-
poused this position.60 This misunderstanding inevitably leads to a 
failure to make the policy choice demanded by the equitable estop-
pel argument. 
CONCLUSION 
So many commentators have debated whether the Statute of 
Frauds is appropriate in the context of modern law61 that an ex-
tensive theoretical re-examination of the problem here would result 
in few, if any, novel conclusions. On the one hand, it can be argued 
that the reliability of the judicial fact determination process has 
improved to such a degree that the requirement of a writing results 
in more harm than good. Indeed, there is a certain amount of statisti-
cal data that tends to support this view.62 On the other hand, a two-
fold answer can be made: first, the Statute of Frauds continues to 
perform useful evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions; 
and second, the legislature alone has the authority to decree that 
justice can best be served by the Statute's abrogation. 
A majority of courts have faced the problem posed by the in-
consistency between the policies of the Statute of Frauds and those 
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and have made a conscious 
determination either to favor the Statute or the estoppel principle. 
A substantial minority, however, have not done so, but have made 
the decision to effectuate or limit the Statute of Frauds by relying 
on doctrines and precedent of little relevance to the issue they were 
asked to face. Thus, in some states, litigants may confront the un-
enviable task of interpreting law that is in a state of nearly impos-
sible confusion. It is to be hoped that the courts in these states will 
avail themselves of the first opportunity to clarify their positions on 
the basic policy issue that underlies the relationship between the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel and the Statute of Frauds. 
59. Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank & Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 515, I A.2d 146, 150 
(1938) (holding that the only difference between part performance and equitable 
estoppel is that the former operates only at equity while the latter is available in 
actions for damages at law); Smith v. Portland Fed. Sav. &: Loan Ass'n, 207 Ore. 546, 
296 P.2d 481, modified 207 Ore. 546, 298 P.2d 185 (1956); Federal Land .Bank v. Matson, 
68 S.D. 538, 541-42, 5 N.W.2d 314, 315 (1942); Beranek v. Gohr, 260 Wis. 282, 287, 50 
N.W.2d 459, 462 (1951). 
60. Brewood v. Cook, 207 F.2d 439, 443-48 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Treadwell v. Henderson, 
58 N.M. 230, 241-45, 269 P.2d ll08, lll5-17 (1954). 
61. See note 5 supra. 
62. See Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds, 79 U. PA. 
L. REV. 440, 442 (1931). 
